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The Persistence of Corruption and
Slow Economic Growth +- A review
A.U. Musa*
I.

Introduction

A

s submitted by the author, corruption and all aspects of poor governance and weak institutions have significant adverse effects on
economic growth and welfare. However, many countries, especially
developing countries, seemed to have been caught up in a vicious cycle
that perpetuates corruption and underdevelopment in their societies. Thus,
because bureaucratic, legal, social and other vital institutions are weak
and/or inadequate, poverty is widespread, the political class is corrupt,
and no effective check for corruption exists. Besides, poverty and lack
tend to further weaken the electorate’s ability to challenge the corrupt
political class. Individuals lack incentives to fight corruption even though
everyone is better off without it. The paper’s objective is to study, formally,
these interactions among the individuals engaged in corruption, and
between the individual and the corrupt political class. In doing this, two
models involving strategic complementarities that lead to multiple equilibra
were used to show these relationships.
II.

Summary of The Paper

The author identified two situations in a corrupt society; (i) the individual
bureaucrat who allocates his labour services between productive activity
and theft of government resources in a classical case of portfolio
adjustment and (ii) the corrupt politician who sets a bribe collection system
(a bribe rate) with the maximization of utility as his goal vis-à-vis similar
decisions by fellow politicians. Both situati on s in volv e strategi c
complementarities in that the decision of A to steal encourages and
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reinforces that of B to do the same or the decision of A not to steal
encourages and reinforces that of B to follow suit.
Model I
In the first case, the author employed Barro’s model of endogenous growth
where government expenditure (G) enters as an input. The author reasoned
that since not all G reaches the production process (some are stolen by
corrupt individuals), economic growth would be adversely affected. Given
total available G and available labour services, which the individual can
allocate between productive work (L) or theft (S) or a combination of both,
the author showed that the individual’s decision boils down to a comparison
between the net wage (W) and the Marginal Propensity for Rent Seeking or
net gains from theft of G (MPRS). He analyzed:
Given a unit of labour, which can be allocated to either Productive work
(L) or Theft of Government resources (S), Total labour usage becomes,
L + S = 1 or S = 1 – L
A good steady state exists when L = 1 or nobody is stealing since all
labour services is allocated to productive work. The other extreme is when
L = 0 and all G is simply being stolen while nobody engages in productive
work. However, since strategic complementarity leads to multiple equilibra,
the author equated the net wage and net gains from corruption functions
and solved the resultant quadratic equation. L 1 (the upper boundary) was
found to be unstable while L 2 (the lower boundary) was stable.
He drew four scenarios from the results above.
1.
The wage curve lies permanently above the MPRS curve (they do
not intersect and L = 1 is the only steady state)
2.

The two curves intersect at two points and L 2 < L 1 < 1

L 2 is stable while L 1 is unstable. This is because an increase in the amount
of L from L 2 leads to W < MPRS and, thus, the individual supplies less
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labour until he returns to L 2 while an increase in L from L 1 leads to W >
MPRS and the individual increases his L, which further reinforces the initial
increase.
3.

The two curves intersect as in (2) above but 1 < L 2 < L 1 (the only
steady state is in L = 1)

4.

The two curves intersect as in (2) above but L 2 < 1 < L 1 (only L 2 is
stable)

In (2) above, e1(L 2) is a “bad” equilibrium while e2(L 1) is a “good” one. This
is because more L enters the production process in L 1 than in L 2. Moreover,
while an increase in L from L 1 leads to higher productive work as against
theft, an increase in L from L 2 is counteracted by individuals supplying
less L so as to force wages back to its initial higher level. Evidently, the
former generates more growth than the latter.
Model II
The second model, which also involves strategic complementarity, assumes
that a corrupt politician will set up a bribe collection system and a bribe
rate (to maximize his utility but which has an upper limit tm (a bribe rate
higher than this will lead to exposure and punishment). The citizen and
the politician both face the problem of maximization of utility.
The Citizen’s Problem
a.
If the citizens do not oust the corrupt government, they obtain
a lifetime utility that is reduced by the bribe rate tm.
b.
If they do oust the government, they obtain utility reduced
by an efficiency loss represented by l (efficiency loss can be
as a result of less competent successor government, political
instability, social unrest causing production disruption, etc)
The author theorized that the citizens could only oust the government if
and only if l < tm.
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The Politician’s Problem
c.
If the government is not ousted, the politician obtains a
lifetime utility commensurate with a bribe rate lower than
the efficiency loss.
d.
If the government is ousted, however, the politician obtains a
utility commensurate with the maximum bribe rate (tm).
e.
The author theorized here that for the cooperative solution,
the politician will choose a bribe rate lower than the efficiency
loss (t < ) if utility is higher in b than in a above while he
will choose (m) if utility is higher in b than in a.
The Bad Equilibrium
All politicians levy a maximum bribe rate, tm and since the government will
collapse anyway, any marginal politician would levy, tm. Investment, growth
and development are seriously hampered and poverty is perpetuated.
The Good Equilibrium
Here, the author theorized that if utility is higher in a than in b, all politicians
will levy a bribe rate lower than the efficiency loss and, thus, the government
is not ousted while investment and growth rate are high, at least higher
than in the Bad Equilibrium.
III.

Comments

The author has done an excellent analysis linking corruption and economic
growth through the mechanisms of the Barro’s model of endogenous
growth. Let me expatiate on two contributions.
(i)

In a succinct way, he showed us formally how an individual
bureaucrat’s decision to steal from the government results in
lower investment and growth. This has implications for several
things in African countries. With reference to Nigeria, we focus
on two:
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1.

Poverty: In spite of the enormous resources (about x12.14 trillion
and x13.63 trillion earned and spent, respectively, by the three tiers
of government in Nigeria in the last ten years (1995 – 2004), it is not
surprising that poverty has not abated and the welfare indices still
look gloomy. An empirical research could be conducted to determine
the actual proportion of those budgets that ended up in the intended
production process and by extension those that did not.

2.

Research: As it is now, research is done primarily by data presented
by various government agencies among others. If a more reliable
data is not available in the short term, then an index (capturing
estimates of how much did not reach the production process) should
be factored into all econometric research involving government
spending. The issue is even more urgent for research into human
development components such as education, health and food
security. This would forestall faulty policy design.
(ii) In his second model, he has also shown us that the citizen faced
with corrupt politicians has to determine whether the bribe rate
is sufficient enough to warrant ousting the government and
i ncurri ng an effi ci en cy loss. Thu s, Non -G ov ernm en tal
Organizations (NGOs), donor agencies and other developed
nations concerned about widespread corruption in developing
countries can target their anti-corruption campaign towards a
reduction in the bribe rate ( or a reduction in the efficiency loss).
In the former, complete transparency in government accounts and
activities can help lower the average bribe rate charged and the
scope while sensitization campaigns on the rights of citizens
can aid them to gauge that actual l is less than a lifetime t.

However, the study was silent on some issues concerning the peculiarities
of developing countries especially those in the Sub-Saharan Africa:
(i)

The author analyzed the problem while assuming institutional
arrangements found only in the developed world. In most African
countries for instance, the civil society is sharply divided into those

84

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

March 2007

significantly above the poverty line and those below it. Nothing like
a virile middle class. Expectedly, the latter that face economic
deprivation seem to lack the will to challenge any corrupt bureaucrat
or politician. It does not seem likely that this group (the poor) or
the few rich who are mostly “comfortable” would make a choice of
ousting a government and, thus, breaking the vicious cycle of
corruption. A much stronger support from external and international
agencies is required. Examples of such worthy causes that are
becoming increasingly prominent are the World Bank anti-corruption
campaign, the Transparency International (TI) initiatives, the UN and
other international agencies, Good Governance watch, etc.
(ii)

The author also suggested that a politician makes a choice between
two bribe rates that offer two different utility levels. He picks the
maximum bribe rate if he perceives the government would collapse.
Since he is in power (and the legal and constitutional structures are
usually weak and full of loopholes), why can’t he levy the maximum
bribe rate and perpetuate himself for sometime or at worst ensure
someone who is his stooge succeeds him? In fact, that is exactly
what is happening in most developing countries of Africa and Latin
America. The case for a more involved campaign for good governance
by all stakeholders cannot be overemphasized.

(iii)

A third issue, which is rather a suggestion than a disagreement, is
that of factoring in religion in the fight against corruption. In Nigeria
for instance, over eighty per cent of the population profess and
practice one of the two major religions both of which fortunately
condemn, in the strongest of terms, corruption and in all its
ramifications. This, in my opinion, is the strongest and most potent
weapon against corruption. Being that corruption is more of a micro
issue that culminates in a macro issue, the print media, electronic
media, fora, campaigns, churches, mosques, christian and islamic
associations, social gatherings, schools, every conceivable medium
should be employed to sensitize and remind people of what their
religions say about corruption. The age-long defense among
researchers that economics should avoid value-laden issues is fast
crumbling in the face of stifling socio-economic problems in Africa.

